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Abstract
In many cases, assessing the quality of goods is hard. For example,
when purchasing a car, it is hard to measure how pollutant the car is since
there are infinitely many driving conditions to be tested. Typically, these
situations are considered under the umbrella of information asymmetry
and as Akelrof showed may lead to a market of lemons. However, we
argue that in many of these situations, the problem is not the missing
information but the computational challenge of obtaining it. In a nut-
shell, if verifying the value of goods requires a large amount of computation
or even infinite amounts of computation, the buyer is forced to use a finite
test that samples, in some sense, the quality of the goods. However, if the
seller knows the test, then the seller can over-fit the test and create goods
that pass the quality test despite not having the desired quality. We show
different solutions to this situation including a novel approach that uses
secure computation to hide the test from the seller to prevent over-fitting.
1 Introduction
In September 2015, The United States Environmental Protection Agency an-
nounced that Volkswagen’s (VW) diesel engines for small cars have been vio-
lating the clean air act. It has been discovered that since 2008, VW have been
equipping their small cars with diesel engines that were designed to operate
differently when being tested, so that they would pass the emissions test while
having higher emissions rates in most road conditions. Therefore, buyers of VWs
diesel cars were under the impressions that they are buying a low-emission car
while the car they were buying had higher emissions than regulations allow. This
can be viewed as an example to the quality uncertainty problem described by
∗This work was conducted while the author was with Bar-Ilan University.
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Akerlof (1970). Indeed, as Akelrof predicted, the market turned into a market of
lemons since it has been discovered that other car manufacturers were installing
similar mechanisms that allowed them to pass the emission tests in ways that
created what can be considered as a false presentation of the emission levels
of the car.1 For example, according to some reports, Fiat diesel engine were
designed such that the emission control system would turn off after 22 minutes
of driving. Coincidentally, the German emission test lasts for 20 minutes.2
Our main observation is that the problem in the diesel engines market is
not necessarily the lack of information on the buyers’ side, but the hardness of
obtaining it. From an information theoretic point of view, buyers, or government
agencies for that matter, had access to the cars and hence if they would have
changed their testing method they would have found that the emission were
beyond the acceptable limits. Therefore, from an information theoretic point
of view, the information was available to them. However, any feasible test can
check the engine only on a finite set of conditions out of infinitely many driving
conditions. Since the sellers knew the conditions that are being tested, they
designed their engines to perform well in the test conditions while not making
the same effort in conditions that were not tested.
Therefore, we claim that we should distinguish between cases that the buyer
does not have access to some information and the case that obtaining the in-
formation is computationally hard. This distinction allows us to address the
latter case using computational techniques. However, before presenting possi-
ble solutions, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves that asymmetric markets have
consequences. Asymmetric markets have been studied extensively since the pio-
neering work of Akerlof (1970). Akerlof stated that the influence on the market
of these situations is greater than just the premium price the buyer pays for a
defective product but also the cost associated with driving legitimate business
out of the market Akerlof (1970). To overcome the challenges of asymmetric
information, signaling can be used by the party that has information that is
missing by the other party if it has the incentives to do so Spence (2002). At
the same time, incentives can be introduced to promote signaling.
In this work, we claim that if the asymmetric condition is due to computa-
tional constraints, it is possible to use computational techniques to alleviate the
problem. We show that such conditions are abundant. We also discuss different
computational solutions: We discuss methods that are currently being used and
analyze their pros and cons. Finally, we show a novel solution that is suitable
for the AI context that uses cryptographic tools to limit the risk of overfitting.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this solution on real world data.
As far as we know, the computational aspects of asymmetric markets were
not studied before. The work of Glaser et al. (2014) is close, in some respects, to
the work presented here. Glaser et al. (2014) looked at the problem of verifying
that countries follow international agreement for nuclear disarmament. The
challenge is to verify that an object that is claimed to be a nuclear warhead is
1http://www.roadandtrack.com/new-cars/car-technology/a29293/vehicle-emissions-testing-scandal-cheating/
2https://www.autoblog.com/2016/04/25/fiat-diesels-cheat-emissions-tests
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indeed what it is claimed to be without each country having to reveal its nuclear
technology. To achieve this goal, the authors designed a clever zero knowledge
proof that the parties can use to prove that an object is indeed what it is claimed
to be without disclosing additional information. In the context of markets, the
problem Glaser, Barak and Goldston study is that the parties would like to
refrain from leaking too much information. Like Glaser et al. (2014), we too
suggest that cryptographic tools can play an important role in solving market
challenges. However, there are key differences between our work and the work
of Glaser et al. (2014). First, their work focusses on a specific scenario (nuclear
disarmament) while we present a wider view. Moreover, we argue that in many
scenarios, it is not only that the seller may wish to hide some information, but
even when given full access, the buyer may find it difficult to fully assess the
quality of goods.
2 Markets with hard to compute qualities
In the introduction, we used the example of diesel engines emissions to demon-
strate a market in which the quality of goods is hard to compute. In this
section we argue that this situation is common. We show that the problem of
such markets has been observed before in diverse fields although the computa-
tional challenge was not spelled out. We also show that with the advance of AI,
these situations are not going to disappear anytime soon.
Campbell’s law states that “The more any quantitative social indicator is
used for social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pres-
sures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it
is intended to monitor” Campbell (1979). This has been demonstrated in many
scenarios. For example, enforcing standardized testing in the US has resulted
in narrowing of the curriculum to focus on the subjects being tested Berliner
(2009). This can be viewed as another instantiation of hard to compute infor-
mation. The goal of unified tests is to verify that all students have a certain
level of knowledge and skills. However, since it is infeasible to test every possible
information and skill, the tests focus on a subset of these and as a result the
education system narrowed its scope to the knowledge and skills that are being
tested.
Goodhart (1984) suggested a law which states that “When a measure be-
comes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”. This has been demonstrated
when looking at countries that adopted inflation targets for their economies
Mishkin and Posen (1998). These countries had to be flexible about these tar-
gets or otherwise the results were not as expected. In the context of our current
analysis, we argue that the problem that Goodhart is pointing to is the problem
of evaluating the social welfare since there are many dimensions in which it could
(and should) be evaluated. Once a single dimension is picked as a measure, the
market would over-fit this dimension and emphasize the discrepancies between
the measure and the intended quality target.
The common theme behind these examples is that there is a target or con-
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dition that has no efficient verification method. In the cars example, it was the
emission rate which is hard to verify because of all the different settings the car
can be in. In the unified tests in US schools, the challenge is to verify that stu-
dents have sufficient general knowledge and skills, and in the economy example
the challenge is in measuring whether the economy is doing well. Since these
are hard to verify qualities, proxies are used. When this happens, the proxy
become the target or put otherwise, you get what you measure. For example,
VW’s engineers, knowing how emissions are being measured, designed engines
that would work favorably under these tests. It is worth noting that this be-
havior is not necessary malicious, and can be the result of the measure itself
becoming the definition of quality in the minds of those involved.
The AI revolution brings with it solutions to problems that could not have
been addressed before such as autonomous cars. In traditional programming
tasks, the engineer designing a solution must define the challenge and a way to
resolve it (algorithm). However, AI tools allow the engineer to solve the chal-
lenge by only demonstrating the desired outcome Carbonell et al. (1983). This
creates a great difference when trying to verify and validate solutions Jacklin et al.
(2004). For example, AI based solutions do not have clear requirements and
therefore cannot be validated, at least not in the standard meaning of valida-
tion in computer science.
The kind of tasks for which AI techniques are useful for are problems for
which we do not have an efficient recipe for solution and the domain is large.3
Therefore, the nature of these tasks makes verifying the solution challenging.
That is, given a solution to such task there is no finite test to ensure that the
AI solution is correct as the following lemma shows
Lemma 1. Let T : X 7→ Y be a task such that X is infinite and |Y | > 1 . Let S
be a finite subset of X. Then for every measure µ over X there exists a model M
such that M(x) = T (x) for every x ∈ S while µ({x : M(x) 6= T (x)}) = 1−µ(S).
Lemma 1 shows that for every finite test and every distribution on the real
world, there may be a solution that fits perfectly the test but performs poorly
in the real world provided that the distribution on the real world is not limited
to the test set.
Proof. Let T be the task and S be the test. Define M such that:{
M (x) = T (x) if x ∈ S
M (x) = T˜ (x) if x /∈ S
where we define y˜ to be y′ ∈ Y such that y′ 6= y.
From the definition of M it follows that M(x) = T (x) for every x ∈ S and
M(x) 6= T (x) for every x /∈ S and therefore for any measure µ on X we have
that µ({x :M(x) 6= T (x)}) = 1− µ(S).
3If the domain is small, it is possible to memorize the right responses for each input and
avoid the need for sophisticated solutions.
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This result may look similar to many results in statistical learning theory.
Indeed, using standard statistical tools, it is possible to show that the perfor-
mance of a model on a test set represents well the performance in the real world.
However, this is under the assumption that the model under investigation is in-
dependent of the test set. But, in Lemma 1, we do not make such an assumption
since, for example, there is no reason to believe that VW developed its engines
while ignoring the way emissions will be tested. Therefore, in statistical learning
theory the typical case is analyzed while here we look at the worst case.
The consequences of Lemma 1 are far reaching when put in the context of
AI. Since the conditions of the Lemma hold for almost any AI task, verifying
that an AI tool fulfils a certain criterion is a prime suspect for over-fitting.
This applies to autonomous cars that are built of many AI components such
as pedestrian detection mechanisms, obstacle avoidance, and route planning.
But it also applies to medical devices such as robotic surgeons, smart medical
monitoring devices, and heart defibrillators Li et al. (2014).
It is important to stress again the difference between the context we are
talking about here and the standard validation/testing scenario in machine
learning. In the machine learning context there are two main approaches to
mitigate this issue. One uses the uniform convergence theorem, such as the VC
theory Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1974). Uniform convergence guarantee that
if the model was selected from a set of models that has low complexity, as mea-
sured for example by its VC dimension, then the performance of the model on a
randomly selected train set is a good estimate of its performance. However, this
solution may not be adequate in the context of contracts and regulations. The
problem with this approach is that it requires not only testing the model but
also the entire process that was used to develop it. Therefore, if a self-driving-
car manufacturer would like to license its pedestrian recognition mechanism, it
would be insufficient to test the mechanism itself and instead, it will be required
to verify that during the entire development process, the manufacturer never
tried a solution that is outside of a given class of solutions.
The other approach is to use a test set that is unknown to the developer
of the model. This is, however, challenging in the context of contracts and
regulations. This is because it not only means that the test cannot be specified
in the contract or the regulation, it also means that there need to be mechanisms
in place to prevent it from leaking. This is the subject of this paper.
3 Verifying inefficiently verified conditions
Lemma 1 shows that when assessing the quality of complex goods, any finite
test is potentially over-fitted unless it is kept secret from the model creator.
Therefore, in this section we discuss methods to keep the model from learning
the test. We focus our attention on AI settings in which processes can be
automated. We focus on three techniques: random tests, one time tests, and
secure tests.
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3.1 Random Tests
One possible solution is to generate a fresh random test every time a model is
to be verified. This prevents the risk of fitting the test set since the test set is
generated only after the model has been submitted for verification. However, it
is expensive since generating the test set may be a costly process. For example,
consider the case of pedestrian detection then every test scenario must be created
and manually annotated.
3.2 One Time Tests
The overhead of random tests can be reduced by allowing periodic tests only.
Say, for example, that models can only be tested once a year on a pre-announced
day. In this case, the leakage of the test is minimal and can be controlled with
standard statistical tools such as Bonferroni correction to handle the risk associ-
ated with many models being tested simultaneously. This method is commonly
used in schools. For example, college candidates can take the SAT exams only
on 7 days during the year. All students take it at the same time to prevent
the test from leaking. Therefore, each test form is used only once for all the
students that are taking it on this specific date. This allows the college board
to test 1.8 million prospective students using only 7 forms during 2017.4 5
This method is efficient and is commonly used when testing human skills.
It is used in school, colleges, bar examinations, and more. However, it has
limitations. For example, such tests can only be offered a few times a year since
each additional date the test is given at requires generating a test from scratch.
3.3 Secure Tests
Secure tests are conducted in a way that prevents information about the test
from leaking and therefore allows reusing the same test. For example, emission
tests can be conducted behind closed doors such that car manufactures would
not be able to see how engines are being tested. However, when evaluating AI
solutions, the seller might be reluctant to give uncontrolled access to its models
due to various reasons such as intellectual property. Another problem with
providing the buyer with access to the models is that the buyer might over-fit
the model to lower the price or even copy it and use it without proper payment.
That is, the buyer might design a test that will give a low score to the model,
so that according to a contractual agreement between them, the price for the
goods will be reduced. Another concern is that by running the test too many
times, information about it might leak by comparing the properties of goods
and the scores they obtain on the test. Therefore, we need mechanisms that
prevent data leakage during the test and mechanisms to prevent data leakage
after the test.
4https://reports.collegeboard.org/sat-suite-program-results/class-2017-results
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3.4 Preventing leakage during test
Let T be a test and M be a model to be tested. Let Eval be the evaluation
function such that Eval(T,M) returns the test score of model M on the test T .
We would like to compute this score without revealing T or M . This can be
achieved using Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) techniques Yao (1982);
Goldreich et al. (1987); Goldreich (2004). Recent advances in MPC allow now
for high throughput computation of complex and arbitrary functions that can be
expressed by a circuit Araki et al. (2016, 2017); Lindell and Nof (2017). These
protocols allow the computation of the score without revealing intermediate
results to the parties involved under various trust assumptions. Some protocols
assume that the parties are honest but curious which means that they would
follow the protocol but would use the pieces of information they gather to learn
about other parties. Other models assume that parties do not have to follow the
protocol, this is referred to as the malicious setting Goldreich (2004). Where
possible, it is preferable to use protocols that are secure in the presence of
malicious adversaries.
The main advantage for using MPC for evaluation is that the model devel-
oper (seller) does not have access to the test and therefore, it cannot over-fit
the test. At the same time, the test provider (buyer) does not have access to
the model and therefore cannot over-fit the model to lower its evaluation. Note
that this is not to say that the buyer cannot design a “hard” test. Rather, it
means that the test cannot be tailored to fail a specific offer and in that sense
it is fair. Methods to incentivize the seller to conduct a “truthful” test or ways
to measure that the test is truthful is a subject for further study.
3.5 Preventing leakage after test
The main promise of conducting secure tests using MPC as described above is
that the test can be reused. However, although the computation is secured, the
result of such computation is revealed and therefore, a seller, or a group of sellers,
can collect a set of (model, scores) pairs and use it to learn about the test. This
can be mitigated using methods of adaptive data analysis Dwork et al. (2015).
The Threshold algorithm (Algorithm 1) is the mechanism we propose for this
task. To protect the tests from being overfitted, it is necessary to add some
randomness Dwork et al. (2014) and therefore if the model’s score is borderline
with respect to the threshold, the Threshold mechanism might fail to detect the
exact side of the threshold the model is at. However, it allows creating n test
cases and using them to test O˜(n2) different models. It is possible to improve on
that if it is assumed that most models will fail in which case it may be possible
to reuse the same tests more. For the sake of clarity we skip this discussion
here.
Theorem 1. Assume that there is a universe T of tests such that t ∈ T is a
function t : M 7→ [0, 1] where M is the space of all possible models. Further-
more, assume that there exists a probability measure µ on T and the goal is to
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assess, for a model M whether Et∼µ[t(M)] ≥ ρ. Let α, β > 0 and select ǫ, δ,
and n such that
ǫ =
α
13
β =
8δ
ǫ5
(
ln
8
δ
)2
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
n =
2
ǫ2
ln
(
8
δ
)
If n tests t1, . . . , tn ∈ T are selected at random from µn and are used to mea-
sure k models M1, . . . ,Mk such that k = O
(
n2/(logn)2
)
through the Threshold(ǫ, δ, k, ρ)
mechanism (Algorithm 1) then with probability 1 − 2β (over the internal ran-
domness of the mechanism and the selection of t1, . . . , tn) the mechanism will
return “pass” for every Mi such that Et∼µ[t(Mi)] ≥ ρ+2α and “fail” for every
Mi such that Et∼µ[t(Mi)] ≤ ρ− 2α.
Theorem 1 shows that in order to be able to verify the quality of a product,
it is possible to use the same n tests again and again, as long as we do not use
them more than O˜(n2) times before creating a new set of n tests. Note, that
the models to be tested can be selected in an adaptive way. That is, M2 may
depend on whether M1 received a “pass” or “fail” score.
The proof uses techniques from the field of Differential Privacy Dwork et al.
(2006). We refer the reader to Dwork et al. (2014) for a comprehensive intro-
duction to this field. To prove Theorem 1 we first prove two lemmas that will be
useful in the proof. Lemma 2 shows that with high probability, the Threshold
mechanism will respond “pass” and “fail” when 1n
∑
j tj (Mi) ≶ ρ±α. Lemma 3
shows that with high probability
∣∣∣ 1n∑j tj (Mi)− Et∼µ [t (Mi)]∣∣∣ ≤ α and there-
fore these two lemmas provide the main tools needed to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Let α, β, ǫ, δ > 0 and assume that the Threshold algorithm is used
with parameters such that it is (ǫ, δ)-Differentially private with a sample of n
tests. Then with probability of at least 1− β:
1. For every model Mi such that
1
n
∑
j tj (Mi) > ρ + α the Threshold algo-
rithm will return “pass”.
2. For every model Mi such that
1
n
∑
j tj (Mi) > ρ − α the Threshold algo-
rithm will return “fail”.
as long as the number of tested models is
k = O
(
n2α2ǫ2(
ln (nαǫ)− 12 ln
(
β ln 1δ
))2 (
ln 1δ
)
)
.
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Proof. Theorem 3.26 in Dwork et al. (2014) shows that the statement of the
lemma we are discussing here holds as long as
αn ≥
(
ln k + ln 2kβ
)√
512k ln 1δ
ǫ
.
Therefore, it holds for
αn ≥
2 ln 2kβ
√(
256β ln 1δ
)
2k
β
ǫ
or when
αnǫ
32
√
β ln 1δ
≥ z ln z (1)
for z =
√
2k/β. (1) holds when z = O (y/ln y) for y = (αnǫ)/
√
β ln 1/δ. Therefore,
k = O
(
βz2
)
= O
(
β
y2
(ln y)
2
)
= O
(
n2α2ǫ2(
ln (nαǫ)− 12 ln
(
β ln 1δ
))2 (
ln 1δ
)
)
Lemma 3. Let t1, . . . , tn be tests randomly selected from the probability measure
µ for n = 2ǫ2 ln
(
8
δ
)
. Assume that the results of these tests are made available
through a set of k queries such that the composition of these responses is (ǫ, δ)-
Differentially private. If an adversary creates k models M1, . . . ,Mk based on
the responses to the k queries and k ≤ n2 then
Pr

sup
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
∑
j
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 13ǫ

 ≤ 8δ
ǫ5
(
ln
8
δ
)2
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
Proof. Each model Mi that the adversary builds can access the tests t1, . . . , tn
only through a set of queries which are (ǫ, δ)-Differentially private. From Propo-
sition 2.1 in Dwork et al. (2014) it follows that the mechanism that generates
each of the Mi’s is (ǫ, δ)-Differentially private. Therefore, using Theorem 1.2 in
Nissim and Stemmer (2015), for each i it holds that
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
∑
j
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 13ǫ

 ≤ 2δ
ǫ
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
.
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Using the union bound:
Pr

sup
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
∑
j
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 13ǫ

 ≤ 2kδ
ǫ
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
.
Using k ≤ n2 = 4ǫ4
(
ln 8δ
)2
completes the proof.
Proof. of Theorem 1
Assume that t1, . . . , tn were selected at random. From Lemma 2 it follows
that the response of the algorithm will be “pass” whenever 1n
∑
tj (Mi) ≥ ρ+α
and “fail” whenever 1n
∑
tj (Mi) ≤ ρ − α with probability 1 − β. Next we
would like to show that with high probability supi
∣∣ 1
n
∑
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣ ≤
α which will complete the proof by using the triangle inequality. The challenge,
however, is that the Mi’s are selected in an adaptive way, that is, based on the
feedback given on previous model and therefore they are not independent of
t1, . . . , tn.
In order to analyze this case, we will create an even harder situation: as-
sume that the adversary can first create k models, Mˆ1, . . . , Mˆk, possibly in an
adaptive way and obtain the pass-fail signal for each one of them. Based on the
k responses on the models Mˆ1, . . . , Mˆk the adversary has to create a set of k
models M1, . . . ,Mk with the attempt that supi
∣∣ 1
n
∑
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣ > α.
Although this new set of models is not built in an adaptive way, this adversary
is actually more powerful since it can use Mi = Mˆi if it chooses to do so.
Theorem 3.25 in Dwork et al. (2014) shows that the Threshold mechanism
is (ǫ, δ)-Differentially private. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3 to conclude
that
Pr

sup
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
∑
j
tj (Mi)− Et [t (Mi)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 13ǫ

 ≤ 8δ
ǫ5
(
ln
8
δ
)2
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
.
By selecting ǫ = α/13 and δ such that
β =
8δ
ǫ5
(
ln
8
δ
)2
ln
(
2
ǫ
)
which means that
δ = O

 α
5β(
ln 1α
)(
ln
(
α5β
(ln 1α )
))2


by the observation that if x = O
(
y (ln y)
2
)
then y = O (x/(ln x)2).
10
Algorithm 1 The Threshold algorithm (modified from the Sparse mechanism
of Dwork et al. (2014))
1: function Threshold(t1, . . . , tn, ǫ, δ, k, ρ)
2: Let σ =
√
32k ln 1
δ
ǫ
3: for i = 1, . . . , k do
4: Receive a model Mi
5: Let si =
∑
j tj (Mi)
6: Sample ri = Lap(σ)+Lap(2σ) where Lap is the Laplace distribution
7: if si + ri > ρ then
8: Output ”pass”
9: else
10: Output ”fail”
11: end if
12: end for
13: end function
4 Experiment
In Section 3.4 we explained that using secure Multi-Party Computation it is
possible to test a model while keeping both the model hidden from the test
and the test hidden from the model. In Theorem 1 we showed that this can
allow us to reuse the test many times. However, these results do not show that
this technology is feasible in terms of computation time on currently available
hardware. In this section we describe an experiment we conducted to confirm
the feasibility of the approach.
For the experiment we simulated the following scenario: a customer would
like to get a loan from a lender. To do that, the customer may apply to several
lenders to shop for the best rates. Each lender computes the interest rate it
is willing to offer by taking in the financial information of the customer and
using historic data to compute the ROI it expects. The lender is not interested
in revealing its “formula” for computing the requested interest rate due to two
reasons. First, it is its intellectual property that may give it an edge over the
competition. But more relevant to the theme of this work is that the assessment
of the risk of lending the money is based on limited view of the customer.
Therefore, if the customer had a full description of the way he or she are being
assessed, they may be able to create a presentation that will work in their
favor, for example by changing the way their credit is distributed without really
changing the amount of money they owe, or issuing the request for the loan
on a date that will maximize their benefits because of arbitrary cutoff dates
in the evaluation model of the lender. At the same time the customer may be
reluctant from providing its financial information to many lending agencies to
shop for the best rates given the risk that even just one of them will leak this
information.
Therefore, we simulated the scenario in which the lender has a model to
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predict the ROI for an offer for a customer based on the financial information
of the customer such that the evaluation is done using MPC in a way that the
customer does not have to reveal its private information and the lender does not
have to reveal its model. To build the model we used data from Lending Club.6
We have used Gradient Boosting Friedman (2001) to train a model consisting
of 32 trees, each one of these trees having 16 leaf nodes to predict the logarithm
of the ratio between the amount of money returned to the amount of credit
given. Therefore, this value is positive whenever the return was greater than
the investment and negative when the customer defaulted and did not return
the entire amount requested. The information about the customer consisted of
48 attributes.7
The MPC protocol was implemented using the protocol of Lindell and Nof
(2017) and its implementation in the SCAPI library.8 This protocol is secure
in the presence of malicious adversaries, utilizes three servers and is secure as
long as at most one is corrupt. The evaluation used 3 servers of type c4.2xlarge
on Amazon Web Services (AWS) with 1GB interconnects. The total time to
apply the model to customers data was measured at 15.4 seconds of which 1
second was used for setup, another 0.9 seconds for offline computation and 13.5
seconds for interaction between the different parties. Furthermore, the amount
of communication exchanged between each player and the other players was
∼ 125MB.
This experiment shows that the process of testing a model, while keeping
both the model private and the test private can be done in a matter of seconds.
Obviously, the exact timing may vary by the size of the model and the size of
the data. However, the time changes linearly with respect to these parameters
and therefore, it is still feasible for many of the applications we are interested
at in this work. Furthermore, this experiment does not simulate the Thresh-
old mechanism (Algorithm 1) however adding the randomness required by this
mechanism should not introduce noticeable difference in the performance.
5 Conclusions
The main observation we make in this study is that in asymmetric markets, the
lack of information of information may be a consequence of a computational
problem, rather than an information theoretic bound. This allows us to suggest
computational methods to address this lack of information. We show that this
problem of asymmetric markets, that was originally presented by Akerlof (1970)
in the context of used cars, appears also in markets of AI based goods. There-
fore, we study ways to reduce the amount of missing information by proposing
the use of secure multi-party computation to make sure that the item being eval-
uated cannot use the inherent limitations of the evaluation method to obtain an
6https://www.lendingclub.com/
7More information about the data used for this experiment can be found at
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action.
8https://github.com/cryptobiu/libscapi from Dec 2017.
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evaluation which does not truly reflect its true value. We show that these tools
are feasible and can be applied to problems of relevant size. Furthermore, we use
Differential-Privacy techniques to analyze the proposed method and show that
it provides accurate estimate of the quality, even if the test is applied multiple
times and the seller can adapt its good trying to get higher scores by using the
feedback from previous runs.
Given that asymmetric markets are common in many fields of life and given
the growth of AI and AI based goods becoming a commodity, we think that
there is great value in studying these markets and proposing new methods for
players to have methods to evaluate products in ways that will better reflect
their true values.
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